

## PROVIDING COMPLEMENTARY EFFECT: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN THEATER AND HIGHER ECHELON COMMANDS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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BETWEEN THEATER AND HIGHER ECHELON COMMANDS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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As successful as the U.S. joint force has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations" (CCJO) outlines the need for change in order to sustain this success in future warfare. One key area of change should be in the roles and relationships between flag officer headquarters. U.S., Alliance and Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are characterized by multiple command headquarters inside and outside the theaters of operation. This current situation is likely to be replicated in future conflicts. Ensuring that each echelon, and each headquarters, provides truly complementary effects is critical to future success. This paper recommends actions for those headquarters out of theater that, once adopted, can ensure that the joint force gains added value from those headquarters out of theater supporting the theater commander. The CCJO's precepts for future joint operations establish the framework for change and an examination of the existing NATO and U.S. chains of command for Afghanistan establish a start point for that change. Finally, the paper concludes with a series of recommendations to greater focus the efforts these multiple echelons of command.



## PROVIDING COMPLEMENTARY EFFECT: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN THEATER AND HIGHER ECHELON COMMANDS

The February 2009 “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations” (CCJO) establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ vision of how the joint force will operate in the future. By assessing current capacity against future requirements, the CCJO establishes that while the existing joint force is both proven and capable, it is not sufficient to meet future requirements. As a result the CCJO emphasizes the need “... to develop new capabilities and change the capacities of existing ones.”<sup>1</sup> The ability to execute newly developed or redeveloped capabilities will in large part be dependent on the ability to command and control them. Thus, as the U.S. military anticipates change to meet future requirements, it must examine the roles and interrelationships of the flag officer headquarters tasked with implementing those changes.

A constant in the U.S. military experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been the growth in numbers and capacity of flag officer headquarters in theater. The roles performed by a single joint task force in Iraq in 2003 (Combined / Joint Task Force – 7) are now performed by three joint task forces in 2011 (Multinational Forces Iraq – I, Multinational Corps – Iraq and Multinational Security and Training Command – Iraq). The missions controlled in Afghanistan by the 10th Mountain Division – based Joint Task Force 180 in 2004 are now controlled by at least six commands: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Headquarters U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR– A), Headquarters ISAF Joint Command (IJC), HQ NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM – A) along with Combined / Joint Interagency Task Forces for anti-corruption and detention operations. The rise in the numbers of

theater headquarters has been accompanied by a rise in their capacity to plan and control theater operations. These theater headquarters are uniformly commanded by seasoned senior general officers and have accompanying staffs with great operational experience. Many of our flag commanders now have repeated tours of duty in both Iraq and Afghanistan and well understand how to plan and execute operations in theater.

Unfortunately, their capacities are not matched by those of the headquarters out of theater that are tasked to resource and direct their efforts. The out of theater chains of command are often characterized by redundancy and reaction and, as a result, the joint or Allied force is not getting full complementary effect from the various echelons of command. Out of theater headquarters do not offer the value added that they should to the theater commander. This paper will offer some ways that they could.

It will begin by outlining future requirements for the joint force as established by the U.S. Joint Force Command's Joint Operating Environment and accompanying Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (version 3). The existing command and control structure for Afghanistan will then be examined in order to provide an example of the likely future shape of command and control architecture and by pointing out redundancies within that structure, further establish the need to better focus the actions of our out of theater headquarters and better support both National policy makers and theater commanders. Finally, the paper will provide a series of recommendations to do this and, in doing so, ensure that our command and control structures are complementary rather than supplementary.

Two caveats are necessary to frame this work. The first is one of definition. "Out of theater" headquarters is defined as any headquarters not deployed to the theater of

operations but within the theater chain of command. Examples of these headquarters include U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), NATO or other Alliance or coalition authorities (examples include Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE] and Joint Force Command – Brunssum [JFC – BS]) and or other National headquarters. The second caveat is frame of reference. Much of the judgments of the efficacy of our out of theater headquarters are driven by my own experience working with them (as a theater – level staff officer in both Iraq and Afghanistan) or in them (most recently as the Chief of the ISAF Operations Team at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE]). While these experiences are “one man’s view” of different echelons in two theaters, I believe the resultant insights and perspectives can be of value when identifying some ways to improve the ability to provide complementary effect.

### Future Requirements

The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Operating Environment (JOE) is designed to inform future joint concepts, doctrine and training by outlining the key facets of the current and future security environments and the resultant impacts on the joint force. While acknowledging the constant, fundamental nature of warfare, the JOE notes that “... changes in the political landscape, adaptations by the enemy, and advances in technology will change the character of war.”<sup>2</sup> The effect of these changes will be to produce an environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict.<sup>3</sup>

The challenges posed by this environment are the basis for the accompanying CJCS produced Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (version 3). This 2009 document provides a “...vision for how the joint force circa 2016-2028 will operate in

response to a wide variety of security challenges.”<sup>4</sup> Its primary purpose is to inform force development and experimentation by establishing a common frame of reference for military and political actors, establishing a conceptual framework as a basis for joint and Service concepts and finally, guiding the study, experimentation and evaluation of joint concepts and capabilities.<sup>5</sup> While it is not joint doctrine and, as such, is neither directive nor authoritative it is informative in that it provides a basis for a common understanding of the operational imperatives to frame future joint operations. Echoing the JOE, the CCJO notes the success of the joint force in our current efforts but goes on to state that future demands will require us to both sustain the progress made to date while changing capabilities, doctrine, organizations and technologies to meet the demands of the future. Underpinning future joint success will be the ability to meet a number of factors, defined in the CCJO as Common Operating Precepts. Achieving these will be integral to future joint force success. They include the following:

- Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and U.S. government, international, and other partners.
- Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space.
- Focus on operational objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most enduring results.
- Combine joint capabilities to maximize complementary rather than merely additive effects.
- Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating advantage.
- Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed effectively.
- Operate indirectly through partners to the extent that each situation permits.
- Ensure operational freedom of action.

- Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.
- Inform domestic audiences and influence the perceptions and attitudes of key foreign audiences as an explicit and continuous operational requirement.<sup>6</sup>

While each is significant and achieving each has its own challenges, two of these precepts are of particular interest. The first is that future joint operations must “Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and U.S. government, international, and other partners”. While the precepts are not stated to be placed in priority order, this precept could be seen as the first among equals. U.S. and Alliance operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are marked by multiple governmental and non – governmental organizations working in the same areas and very few report to any common headquarters. Moreover, these operations are not purely U.S. operations. Operations in Iraq are coalition operations. U.S. operations in Afghanistan are subsumed within the NATO Alliance and must not only be coordinated with NATO policy, but also be adapted or constrained to fit that policy. Thus, with little unity of command, the best a force can hope for is unity of effort. Indeed, as stated in the CCJO “The problem of achieving and maintaining operational coherence is more important and difficult than ever before....”<sup>7</sup> This problem is specifically addressed as one found between the military instrument and other government or non-governmental organizations. Stating that the U.S. joint force has already “...established effective mechanisms for achieving internal unity of effort based on a single military chain of command...” its premise is that there must be increased emphasis on gaining and maintaining unity of effort where unity of command is impractical or impossible to achieve.<sup>8</sup>

The second is the precept to “Combine joint capabilities to maximize *complementary* (emphasis added) rather than merely additive effects.” The essence of the precept is that the joint force must take all actions necessary to provide the right combination of service capabilities in order to ensure that the sum does, indeed, reflect more than the total of its parts. That this is hardly a revolutionary notion is acknowledged by the authors who state that “Joint synergy essentially ‘scales up’ the commonly understood mechanism of combined arms.”<sup>9</sup> However, the notion of complementary vice additive effects is insightful and recalls a similar notion applied to tactical direct fire planning. In that model, true mass relies on complementary effect: each weapon system firing at a unique target. Direct fire mass is diametrically opposed to volume of fire: multiple systems firing at the same target. Achieving complementary effect at the operational or strategic level relies not only upon *combining* service capabilities, thus enhancing the power of the force, but also using one Service’s capability to obviate the use of another. An example would be the use of U.S. Air Force close air support *instead of* U.S. Marine Corps support. While both forms of air support have their utility, and both can be appropriate to a given situation, the thrust of the CCJO’s argument is valid. Instead of “piling on” we must apply the best of one service or capability in order to avoid the requirement to apply another one. This same precept can be extended to relationships between headquarters and echelons of command. By examining the capabilities of each we can use these as a basis to gain complementary effect from our chains of command. Instead of layering multiple headquarters with supplementary roles, we can achieve true mass by focusing each headquarters to best take advantage of its unique capabilities.

Meeting these two precepts will rely upon well developed, mutually supportive headquarters. Achieving unity of effort will require constant dialogue with National authorities to ensure understanding of common end state. Maximizing complementary effect will rely upon headquarters that can recognize and focus on executing unique roles while shedding those better executed by another headquarters. The current situation in the ISAF chain of command provides an example of the current state of affairs and exemplifies the need for change.

The command structure for ISAF is complex with dual U.S. and Alliance chains and features a number of flag officer headquarters (see Figure 1: ISAF Command and Control).

Figure 1: ISAF Command and Control

The theater commander, General Petraeus, is dual-hatted. In his NATO capacity as COMISAF his immediate commander is the Commander, Joint Force Command – Brunnsom (COM JFC BS) who is a German four star general. COM JFC BS is designated the “operational headquarters” for ISAF and is responsible for providing operational guidance and direction for the mission, relaying SACEUR’s direction, and executing multinational training programs.<sup>10</sup> JFC BS maintains a 24 / 7 operations center to monitor and report tactical events (“Significant Activities” or SIGACTS) and prepare and submit daily, weekly and bi-annual reports and assessments. COM JFC BS reports to SACEUR who is headquartered at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SACEUR is one of two “strategic commanders” within the NATO Alliance and is responsible for overall command of the ISAF mission to a number of bodies. First, he reports to the NATO Military Committee. The Military Committee (MC) is the senior military authority in NATO and is charged to link Alliance political and military organizations. It is the primary source of military advice to the NAC while also serving as a source of guidance to the strategic military headquarters (e.g. SHAPE).<sup>11</sup> The MC is chaired by a four star flag officer (currently an Italian Admiral) and sits in permanent session with military representatives from each member Nation but can meet with representation from each Nation’s Chief of Defense. SACEUR also reports to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Chaired by the Secretary General, this is NATO’s senior policy making body and is formed by Permanent Representatives at the Ambassadorial level that represent the Alliance heads of state or government or ministers of defense.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, in the NATO chain of command, two four star headquarters (JFC BS and SHAPE) and one four star chaired committee (the NATO Military Committee) separate COMISAF from the ultimate NATO decision making body, the North Atlantic Council. Differentiating the roles and responsibilities between SHAPE and JFC BS is problematic; both perform largely redundant roles and execute redundant tasks. Both headquarters monitor the same tactical operations in great detail and provide daily and weekly operations summaries and reports which review tactical operations down to the Regional Command level. Both JFC BS and SHAPE produce Operations Plans (OPLANS) for ISAF which have essentially redundant content. Finally, both produce semi – annual mission assessments which are, again, largely redundant.<sup>13</sup> Their unique roles are limited to training and contracting authorities (which are solely a JFC BS function) and force generation (which is solely a SHAPE function).<sup>14</sup>

The U.S. chain is slightly more streamlined. In his U.S. capacity, General Petraeus is Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR – A) and reports to Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM, like SHAPE and JFC BS, monitors ongoing operations, provides orders and plans and conducts assessments. Commander, CENTCOM (COMCENT) reports to the Secretary of Defense (the apex of the U.S. military chain of command) while informing and coordinating with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required.

There are multiple points of interaction between both U.S. and NATO chains of command. The first is between JFC Brunsum and CENTCOM. As the “operational headquarters”, COM JFC Brunsum has been granted direct liaison authority with CENTCOM to coordinate operational issues. Another point lies in the dual roles of the

SACEUR who is dual hatted as Commander, U.S. European Command (COMEUCOM). As COMEUCOM he is a supporting combatant commander to CENTCOM for support to Operation Enduring Freedom which is the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Indeed, EUCOM has played a key role in coordinating U.S. support to ISAF training and manning efforts and COMEUCOM places much effort towards this role. However, he is also SACEUR and, as such, is firmly within the NATO chain of command. Thus, one commander sits within and astride both chains of command: a significant means of interaction. Unfortunately, his staffs are separated. Aside from a small advisory group in Belgium, the EUCOM staff sits in Germany and no common secure computer network links them. Thus while the Commander sees the same mission from both perspectives, his two staffs rarely share that common, unified perspective.

Finally, both the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff perform not only their U.S roles but also NATO roles. Both sit on the NATO North Atlantic Council and the NATO Military Committee when they meet in either Minister of Defense or Chiefs of Defense formats. Thus, both chains of command interact and intertwine at multiple levels.

On the whole the ISAF chain of command has two significant features. First is that it is marked by dual chains of command (both Alliance and National) with multiple links between those chains. Next, is that it features multiple, senior level headquarters, often with redundant functions, separating the theater headquarters from senior level policy or command authority. This complex, echeloned, inter-related and multinational ISAF chain of command is likely to be replicated in future conflict.

While each is staffed with competent, qualified personnel, their efforts are often focused on reinforcing or reporting theater operations – creating a supplementary effect – rather than focusing on what they, uniquely, can provide thus providing a complementary effect. Thus, the problem becomes one of ensuring that each of those echelons, each of the headquarters, adds utility to the fight. Theater headquarters plan and control full spectrum campaigns and are more than capable of translating strategic guidance into tactical effect. The issue lies with the out of theater headquarters. What must their charter be and how can it be executed in order to add unique utility to the theater commander?

### Recommendations

In 1990, then General Crosbie Saint noted “...Army Group Commanders must avoid doing everyone else’s job after they have laid the groundwork for the campaign.”<sup>15</sup> While we no longer have Army Groups, nor those in command of them, his premise remains valid. Commanders must remain focused on *their* job. Delineating their “job” according to a level of war is less than helpful. The debates and accompanying theoretical on upsmanships surrounding responsibilities within and between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war often take us away from a focus on what it really important: achieving both unity of effort and complementary effect. A basis for a more effective means to delineate responsibilities is found in Joint Publication 1 “Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States” which states that complementary synergy requires “... understanding the particular capabilities and limitations that each component brings to the operation.”<sup>16</sup> While this concept as stated is one based on service interaction, it is equally applicable to the interaction between echelons of

command and headquarters. Thus, synergy in a chain of command relies upon each headquarters understanding its unique capabilities and limitations and focusing its energies accordingly. Quite simply, each headquarters should focus its efforts on providing that which the subordinate and superior headquarters cannot provide. While each echelon and headquarters out of theater has unique capacities, there are some general functions unique to all of them.

The first of these is to provide guidance and direction in the form of orders and plans. U.S. headquarters in both Iraq and Afghanistan are de facto Joint Task Forces that are established for a specific purpose and have limited planning horizons.<sup>17</sup> While they are clearly planning far beyond these doctrinal norms, it should not be assumed that their successors will be able to do so. Future JTFs, established for a specific mission, should not be counted upon to have the broader view of the other issues outside their theater, most significantly those of National policy, which could and likely will affect and constrain their operation. While theater commanders and staffs are eminently qualified to develop comprehensive theater campaign plans that identify what must be done, these should be based on a larger, strategic, plan that identifies how these operations support policy. Thus, while the theater commander may not need guidance on the “how,” he does need guidance on the “why.” In order to add value to theater efforts, out of theater headquarters’ plans should focus on designating an end state that supports National or Alliance policy, focus on assessing that end state, identifying and assessing risks to the mission and constraining the operation.

Out of theater headquarters must design and publish a theater end state which achieves National or Alliance policy ends. Those headquarters, often co-located with

political leadership, are uniquely positioned to synchronize policy with operations and execute the "...candid and continuous dialogue between political and military leaders" required to reconcile political purpose with military means."<sup>18</sup> Moreover, that policy must be translated into effective strategy to enable theater operations. As Richard K. Betts observes, strategy is a bridge between policy and operations that "...allows elements on either side to move to the other" thus integrating political and military criteria rather than separating them into discreet boxes.<sup>19</sup> Some recent work builds on this argument to make a case that campaign planning should be reserved for those headquarters in capitals. Because campaign planning, they argue, is currently a *product* of strategy it "...must occur in national capitals or at least within the National strategic leadership"<sup>20</sup> which are best positioned to execute the detailed coordination of "domestic and international politics with military, diplomatic and informational actions."<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, this is routinely seen as a theater responsibility. Indeed, all too often, "...synchronizing policy ends with national ways and means is seen as a delegated technical .... matter."<sup>22</sup> While theater commanders will continue to create theater strategic campaign plans, translating policy into guidance for the theater commander is a unique responsibility of an out of theater headquarters and is essential towards resourcing the theater effort.

Beyond designating an end state, our out of theater headquarters must assume the lead role of assessing and, as required, adjusting the end state. As *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy* observes, in the protracted conflicts of today as a "...war progresses, the strategic ends of the belligerents will usually evolve steadily."<sup>23</sup> Out of theater headquarters removed from the daily "grind" of theater operations and

with less personnel turnover have the opportunity to focus on these strategic ends and assess their feasibility and suitability. The out of theater headquarters must be able to project the current trends forward in time and surmise the resultant end state.

Routinely, when things go wrong, we look to correct them by adjusting the forces or their tactics. An example of this is the discussions and planning over the so – called “Surge” in Iraq in 2006. The discussions revolved not around adjusting the end state – but adjusting the means and ways to execute that end state. However, there is often nothing wrong with the tactics, and the appropriate forces and means are available. The problem is with the end state: it is not feasible. So, we increase forces or adjust tactics in an attempt to meet an infeasible end state. In order to avoid this in the future, we must evaluate our end state prior to evaluating our “ways” or “means”. Our headquarters out of theater must assume that function.

Our out of theater headquarters must also be those focused on identifying and mitigating risks to mission. The ability to identify, articulate and then mitigate risk is inherent in any level of operation. However, headquarters at each level often analyze risks to *forces* vice risks to *mission*. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) can provide an example. While increasing IED use and lethality is a hazard that results in a risk to our *forces* and may result in a risk to a *company or battalion level mission*, it is not a risk to the *U.S. or Alliance mission*. These national or alliance hazards and risks are different but must be identified, articulated and mitigated to the same level that we do tactical ones. Examples of the latter could include budgetary constraints. If the mission is to improve the capability of Afghan security forces, a lack of funding is a hazard that could pose a direct risk to mission. Another may be the lack of Alliance consensus. A

poor understanding of our mission within alliance or coalition capitals can result in a lack of political support, which in turn prevents consensus and paralyzes Alliance actions and effectively culminates the mission. These are hazards and risks to mission and these are the ones that out of theater headquarters must put their energies into identifying and developing means to mitigate. Finally, the out of theater headquarters must ensure that these risks are clearly articulated to, and understood by, our political leadership.

Another key element of guidance and direction must be that of limiting the operation. While it may seem counter-intuitive, sometimes limiting the operation is an important means to resource the operation. Limitations, both constraints and restraints, can narrow the scope of theater responsibilities (thus better aligning tasks with the means available) while concurrently placing more of the burden on out of theater headquarters.<sup>24</sup> An example of restraints could be ones of engagement, restricting a theater commander's ability to meet with Alliance heads of state while firmly placing that on the shoulders of SHAPE or JFC Brunssum (in the case of the NATO chain of command). A significant means to constrain the operation is to establish priorities for the theater commander. While the tasks assigned to a theater commander are broad and extensive, his means to achieve them may be limited. As a result, while a theater commander must operate continuously throughout his entire battle space, he cannot do everything equally well. While all tasks are important; not are all equally important. He has to have priorities that enable him to better focus limited means while also allowing him to assume educated risk in other areas. Out of theater headquarters should assign these priorities and assume the risks entailed in that prioritization. A final means to

constrain the operation is for an out of theater headquarters to retain command over forces and functions. Notwithstanding the validity of resourcing the theater with the forces appropriate to the mission; providing forces, and their implied missions, to the theater sometimes just adds an additional burden. An example is the wholesale transfer of theater sustainment forces in Iraq from ARCENT / CFLCC to V Corps in May and June 2003. While the Corps gained additional forces (namely Military Police, Signal and Logistics units) it also assumed full responsibility for missions that, heretofore, had been reserved for CFLCC. Thus, while the good news was that additional forces were provided, the bad news was that with them came a complex mission set that the in theater headquarters was not prepared to assume.<sup>25</sup>

Out of theater headquarters should also be the headquarters that communicate the mission's successes and justify the need for change. Antulio Echavarria argues that "Political and military leaders must habituate themselves to thinking more thoroughly about how to turn combat successes into favorable strategic outcomes."<sup>26</sup> While Echavarria's statement is in the context of establishing the requirement to maintain a focus on the purpose of war, versus the battles that comprise it, the statement also applies to an important function that out of theater headquarters can achieve: communicating tactical success in order to protect the will of National populations. "Strategic communications" has become a significant feature of any discussion of military operations. Unfortunately our various echelons of command focus their communications on the same audiences: everyone. An important resource for the mission is the will of the Nation to commit forces and means to the mission. By communicating theater successes to those Nations' capitals and populations out of

theater headquarters can ensure that the theater is resourced. Moreover, by communicating the need to change the mission, these same headquarters can justify additional commitments to the mission. While the theater commander must focus his messages to the populations in his battle space, those out of theater must focus on other audiences, in particular those National policy makers and populations that control the means and will to fight.

Another unique area for the out of theater headquarters is to increase private sector involvement. Theater operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify the complex “hybrid” conflicts envisaged in the future. These operations rely upon social, economic development as much as, perhaps more so, than they do military success. Unfortunately, development efforts in both theaters are predominately executed with public funds and with public sector employees (be they uniformed or civilian). The United States is committing billions of taxpayer’s dollars into development through USAID. Most NATO allies are doing the same through their counterpart organizations. Thus, we have governments and public funds focused on developing what private businesses do best. While USAID performs great service, it is comprised of government employees. Government employees are not best suited to build private sector economies - businessmen are. Someone has to involve the private sector and one headquarters has to coordinate that. This should be a role for an out of theater headquarters. As an example, if the goal is to develop an Afghan oil industry, Shell Oil (or any other such commercial firm) could be an invaluable partner. The same could hold true for banking. If the goal is to develop a modern banking system, Fortis Bank or BNP Paribas could provide much more expertise than could our own, limited, public

sector experience. Coordinating private sector involvement can be an important means for the out of theater headquarters to shape the fight for the theater commander.

Finally, the out of theater headquarters can serve as an important source of context and information by providing continuity of experience. Our theater headquarters are staffed primarily with individuals on a variety of tour lengths, few in excess of 12 months. Out of theater headquarters are staffed with much more continuity. An example is SHAPE's ISAF Operations Team of approximately 20 personnel most of whom will spend the bulk, if not all, of their three year assignment working purely ISAF policy and operations. These headquarters have the records, background and experience to resource the theater with a long term, broad institutional memory. While there is often a strict division between those "boots on the ground" and a concomitant reluctance to gain advice from those who are not "on the ground," those who ignore the advice and perspectives of an out of theater headquarters are depriving themselves and their mission of a valuable source of input.

## Conclusion

A feature of any future conflict will be multiple headquarters operating both inside and outside the theater of operations. The ability to ensure unity of command and effort while concurrently gaining complementary effect will rely on deconflicting the roles and responsibilities of each of these headquarters. While each is filled with hard working, talented commanders and staff officers, the sum of their efforts does not always produce as much utility as it could. Gaining this complementary effect is predicated on focusing on each echelon executing what it is uniquely positioned to do. While the

specifics may vary, in general out of theater headquarters can play a valuable role to the theater commander by ensuring that theater operations achieve policy ends and then, beyond that, constraining and prioritizing theater operations and assuming the risks inherent with that. Assuming this function also relies upon the efforts of our theater commanders. As our out of theater headquarters assume more roles and more functions our theater commanders must relinquish some functions that have become seen as part of their responsibilities (e.g. policy interface) . They must do their part by allowing the out of theater headquarters to do their jobs. As those headquarters out of theater provide greater value, we will do much to provide the kind of complementary

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (v. 3.0), (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 15, 2009), iv.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, February 18, 2010), 8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (v. 3.0), iii.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (v. 3.0), 21-28.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>10</sup> "Joint Force Command Brunsum Mission," linked from *Allied Command Operations Home Page* at "Command Structure," <http://www.aco.nato.int/page1297375.aspx> (accessed December 10, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> "The Military Committee," linked from *NATO Home Page* at "NATO A to Z," [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49633.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49633.htm) (accessed 30 January 2010).

<sup>12</sup> “The North Atlantic Council,” linked from *NATO Home Page* at “NATO A to Z,” [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49763.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm) (accessed 30 January 2010).

<sup>13</sup> The author was responsible for preparation of SHAPE’s bi-annual “Periodic Mission Review” of the ISAF mission from 2009 – 2010. These reviews, prepared by the SHAPE J3 ISAF Operations Team, were fed by the JFC – BS assessments and submitted to NATO Headquarters.

<sup>14</sup> The author had the regular responsibility to coordinate ISAF operational issues between JFC – BS, SHAPE and the NATO International and International Military Staffs from 2006 – 2010 as part of both the SHAPE Command Group and SHAPE J3.

<sup>15</sup> General Crosbie E. Saint “A CinCs View of the Operational Art,” *Military Review*, September 1990, [http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p124201coll1&CISOPTR=540&CISOBX=1&REC=9](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p124201coll1&CISOPTR=540&CISOBX=1&REC=9) (accessed 24 November 2010).

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States”, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14, 2007), III – 12.

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Joint Publication 3-33 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 16, 2007), ix – 4.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (v. 3.0), 2.

<sup>19</sup> Richard K. Betts, “The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy with Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 29 (Autumn 2001 – Winter 2002): 24.

<sup>20</sup> Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy*, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 5.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>22</sup> Paul Newton, Paul Colley, and Andrew Sharpe, “Reclaiming the Art of British Strategic Thinking,” *RUSI Journal* 155, no.1 (February / March 2010): 47.

<sup>23</sup> Kelly and Brennan, *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy*, 8.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operational Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Final Coordinating Draft) (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2010), IV – 8.

<sup>25</sup> Author’s Personal Experience.

<sup>26</sup> Dr. Antulio Echavarria, *Towards an American Way of War*, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 17.